Why do legislators invest scarce time and resources into forming and maintaining voluntary groups that provide few obvious benefits? Legislative member organizations (LMOs)-such as caucuses in the US Congress and intergroups in the European Parliament (EP)-exist in numerous law-making bodies around the world. Yet unlike parties and committees, LMOs play no obvious and pre-defined role in the legislative process. "Bridging the Information Gap" argues that LMOs provide legislators with opportunities to establish social relationships with colleagues with whom they share a common interest in an issue or theme. The social networks composed of these relationships, in turn, offer valuable opportunity structures for the efficient exchange of policy-relevant information between legislative offices. Building on classic insights from the study of social networks, the authors demonstrate that LMO networks are composed of weak, bridging ties that cut across party and committee lines, thus providing lawmakers with access to otherwise unattainable information and make all members of the network better informed. Building on a comparative approach, the book provides an overview of the existence of LMOs across advanced, liberal democracies and offers two nuanced case studies of LMOs in the European Parliament and the U.S. Congress. These case studies rely on a mixed method setup that garners the respective strengths of social network analysis, sophisticated statistical methods, and careful qualitative analysis of a large number of in-depth interviews.
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Chapter 1
Networking the Information Gap:
The Social and Political Power of Legislative Member Organizations
In the aftermath of the September 11, 2001, terrorist attacks in the United States a number of lawmakers and commentators put forward a short-lived and ultimately unsuccessful proposal that the U.S. Congress have the option to do its work remotely-a "virtual Congress" they called it (Cohen 2002) . The proposal was fueled, in part, by widespread speculation that the target of one of the hijacked airplanes may have been the White House or the U.S. Capitol; however, a number of members of Congress raised immediate and strong opposition to the virtual Congress suggestion, objecting to the loss of human interaction. Congressman David Dreier (R-CA), then Chair of the House Rules Committee, wrote:
"As an organization, Congress functions in large part because of the regular and personal interactions among Members as they work to build consensus on issues ranging from procedural matters to the budget and appropriations legislation" (Dreier 2001) .
Dreier and others recognized that there is great value in the personal relationships between lawmakers. However, lawmaking has changed dramatically over the last 50 years. Across different legislatures and parliaments, lawmakers find they have fewer opportunities to interact personally with their colleagues because of busy travel schedules and because face-to-face discussions are being replaced with electronic exchanges using smart phones and internet-based communication. In the U.S., for example, many members of Congress are part of the so-called "Tuesday to Thursday" club, where legislators tend to only be in town for a few days mid-week and spend the remainder of their time in their districts (Mann and Ornstein 2006, 169) . Such developments have raised concerns about a decline in civil interaction in legislative politics (Uslaner 1993), because "personal relationships, face-to-face negotiations, building of trust and reciprocity in human behavior on the Hill necessitates being together in one room" (James Thurber, quoted in Keller 2001).
While personal connections and contacts are often significant in determining the outcome of political events, it is not well understood how such relationships and social networks are created and maintained, and what specific benefits they provide.
Lawmakers are notoriously busy people whose time is constantly pressed and whose attention is constantly sought. They also face countless collective action and coordination problems in their pursuit of policy, power, and electoral victories. What mechanisms do lawmakers have to help overcome these collective action and coordination problems and develop useful networks with fellow lawmakers and relevant outside actors? The obvious answers discussed in the literature are institutional leadership, party organizations, legislative committees, and the seniority system, among other institutions (see Shepsle and Bonchek 1997 and Stewart 2001 for overviews). But do these institutions sufficiently satisfy lawmakers' needs to build and maintain the relationships that are imperative to the lawmaking process?
In this volume we argue that Legislative Member Organizations (LMOs) are often overlooked institutions that help to connect lawmakers in a loose web of relationships that enable vital information to flow efficiently through lawmaking bodies. These LMOs serve a utilitarian purpose, are common throughout the world, and are woefully understudied.
What is a Legislative Member Organization?
All decision-making bodies face a variety of coordination dilemmas. Scholars have written extensively about the formal institutions that legislatures have developed to help decision-makers solve their coordination and collective action dilemmas. Legislative parties help large governing groups coordinate strategies and votes (Cox and McCubbins 1993, 2005) . Committee systems promote division of labor and help legislators or parliamentarians develop policy expertise (Krehbiel 1991 The presence of these organizations in many legislatures suggests their utility, despite their undefined role in the legislative process and the uncertain benefits they seem to offer. We surmise that if legislators decide to join LMOs, maintain them, and take part in their activities, LMOs likely offer some benefits that the more formal legislative institutions of parties and committees do not. Our comparative research identifies the roles and benefits of LMOs across a variety of legislatures, and lays out a generalizable theory of LMOs.
Relationships and Information: The Role of LMOs in Legislative Politics
We define Legislative Member Organizations as voluntary organizations within lawmaking bodies that are made up of members who share a common interest in a particular political issue or theme. These voluntary organizations give lawmakers the opportunity to build utilitarian social networks that facilitate the efficient flow of policyrelevant information. 2 As such, LMOs help legislators overcome an institutional collective action dilemma, where the outcomes of collective actions may be sub-optimal, but a lack of coordination within the formal institutions makes the realization of a more widely preferred outcome less likely (Feiock and Scholz 2010) . In the case at hand, the institutional collective action dilemma revolves around the high demand and insufficient supply of information in legislative politics.
Legislators require information about policy and politics. They want to know their colleagues' preferences over policy. They want to know their constituents' preferences over policy. They want to know how policy will affect their constituents and whether there could be court action against a policy. There is virtually no limit to information legislators seek in their efforts to pursue policy and political goals. Since their thirst for information knows no bounds, likewise their desire for good sources of information is never satisfied. Legislators need knowledge and information, and no legislature fully addresses the informational needs of its members. LMOs, we maintain, help alleviate the informational deficit inherent in legislative politics.
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LMOs are not the only sources of information for lawmakers, of course. In particular, legislators can and do rely on parties and committees, the principal formal legislative institutions, to gather information. We maintain, however, that parties and committees suffer from a number of weaknesses when it comes to the creation and diffusion of information. Most importantly, they compel individual legislators to primarily interact with a relatively small, predetermined set of colleagues, which impedes the flow of new, innovative policy ideas. LMOs, in contrast, provide opportunities for members of different social groups to form interpersonal ties (see Brass et al. 2004, 808) , as they are composed of heterogeneous groups of legislators from different parties and committees. LMOs thus make up social networks that cut across party lines and committee jurisdictions, which makes them important venues for deliberation and cooperation, but most importantly for the exchange of policy-relevant information. LMO networks give legislative actors the opportunity to be better informed when a particular topic relating to the issue or cause of the LMO rises to prominence on the legislative agenda.
LMOs allow both substantive information (i.e., policy oriented information about the content and expected consequences of legislative proposals) and political information (e.g., strategic information about the policy positions of other decision-makers) to be efficiently diffused throughout legislative arenas. This information flow, we argue, is promoted through LMO-based social networks composed of ties with two key characteristics: they are weak as well as bridging.
Sociologist Mark Granovetter's seminal work on the "strength of weak ties"
demonstrates theoretically and empirically how effective social coordination takes place in networks with many weakly tied actors, rather than from those with many strong ties (Granovetter 1973 (Granovetter , 1974 . The intuition behind the theory is that close friends, with whom one is connected through strong ties, are likely to have contacts who share characteristics and, therefore, access to the same information. One's acquaintances, in contrast, with whom one shares weak ties, are more likely to have access to information that would otherwise be outside of one's reach, because one's social networks expand beyond one's group of close friends. Empirically, Granovetter demonstrates that job seekers with many weak ties are more likely to receive information about available jobs and are more likely to secure a better job (in terms of salary and job satisfaction) than those with mostly strong ties (Granovetter 1974).
LMO networks are networks primarily composed of weak ties that bridge structural holes in the legislative network (Burt 1992 (Burt , 2000 (Burt , 2004 . While many legislators will, of course, have a variety of strong ties to other legislators with whom they can exchange information, we should expect information in those tightly-knit networks to often be redundant. In contrast, legislators who are able to access information from colleagues who are unlike themselves (e.g., from a different party, from a different region, from a different committee, or from the other side of the ideological spectrum) are more likely to have access to valuable information that they would not otherwise receive.
Therefore, social institutions that allow legislators to create weak, bridging connections between one another have great informational value. The more weak connections we observe, and the more cross-cutting these connections are in that they connect otherwise disconnected parts of the network, the more efficiently information should flow through a network of lawmakers. This not only makes individual lawmakers more informed, it also increases the overall level of "informedness" and expertise of the legislature as a whole (Burt 2000; Carpenter, Esterling and Lazer 1998).
That LMOs are voluntary institutions contributes to their being weak and bridging. Legislators are not assigned to LMOs, and they will not suffer direct negative consequences if they decide to stay outside the LMO system. This means that legislators, as exceedingly busy people, are unlikely to spend as much time on LMO activities as on their formal responsibilities in their parties and committees; that they are not required to interact with their LMO colleagues on a regular basis; and that they are not compelled to expend time and resources on fostering LMO ties. In this sense, voluntariness contributes to the weakness of most LMO ties. 4 The voluntary nature of LMOs also means that lawmakers are free to join and participate in LMOs based on personal interests and policy priorities, rather than ideological preferences or committee jurisdictions. Given the difficulties associated with measuring indirect and diffuse influence, it would be easy to discount or dismiss the role of LMOs in legislative politics. This would be problematic, however, not only because it ignores empirical realities, but also because diffuse influence is often exceedingly consequential. By way of analogy, much evidence shows that campaign contributions do not buy the votes of legislators in the U.S.
Congress, but nonetheless there is almost universal agreement that the activities of lobbyists and interest groups, as the sources of many campaign funds, have some influence in the policy-making progress. The volumes of literature exploring the various means by which this influence manifests itself show that it is important to understand how these external actors impact policymaking. The same can be said for LMOs-they may only indirectly affect the outcome of a piece of legislation, and it may be difficult to tie LMO activities to particular legislative outcomes; but, as we will show, it is difficult not to recognize that they play an important role in the legislative process.
To summarize our argument, LMOs are voluntary institutions inside legislatures that help lawmakers overcome informational collective action dilemmas by encouraging the establishment and maintenance of social relationships between interested actors inside and outside the legislative arena who share a common policy priority. These relationships make up extensive social networks composed, primarily, of weak ties that cut across party and committee lines, thus facilitating the diffusion of high-utility policy and political information that contributes to the creation of "good" public policy.
What We Know about LMOs
Previous scholarly research on LMOs has concentrated, nearly exclusively, on the U.S. Congress. This body of research has, for example, richly described the history of the caucus system, why members of congress join them, the purposes and functions caucuses serve, and how they interact with other branches of government (e.g., Hammond 1998). 7 We also learn from these studies that the membership of caucuses is ideologically diverse and may counterbalance power from the committee system (Ainsworth and Akins 1997, but see Victor and Ringe 2009). Caucuses serve a number of important functions in lawmaking, including helping to establish and maintain government and public agendas (Hammond, Mulhollan and Stevens 1985) , collecting information (Fiellin 1962; Stevens, et al. 1974; Stevens, et al. 1981; Hammond 1998; Hammond, et al., 1985) , Overall, we may group the potential roles of LMOs in the legislative process into three categories: information acquisition, provision, and exchange; political coordination (such as agenda setting, search for compromise, and building policy coalitions); and signaling (of policy priorities to constituents). We find and present evidence for all three functions throughout this book, yet our focus is primarily on the informational function of
LMOs. This emphasis is not to deny or discount the variety of functions LMOs may serve in a given legislature, but the result of three factors. First, while the coordination and signaling functions of LMOs are more or less prominent in different legislatures, for reasons we explain below, their informational role is a universal property: LMOs allow for the efficient exchange of information through the social networks they comprise.
Second, the other roles ascribed to LMOs in much of the existing literature, in particular their coordination function, critically depend on the capacity of LMOs to connect political actors who share common policy interests and allow for the efficient flow of information between them. Policy coordination thus presupposes the exchange of both substantive and political information. Finally, our empirical results (in particular our extensive qualitative data) overwhelmingly support the proposition that the major benefit of LMOs lies in their capacity to provide and diffuse policy-relevant information between legislative actors. Ascribing a secondary role to the signaling and coordination function is, therefore, not simply an a priori theoretical decision; it reflects empirical realities on the ground. These considerations warrant our primary focus on LMOs as information networks.
In a first attempt to link the study of social connections in legislative politics with the investigation of the role and structure of LMO-based social networks, Victor and 
A Comparative Research Design
To test our expectations about the existence and roles of LMOs in legislatures, we rely on a comparative research design that has two primary components. First, we collect data on the existence of LMOs in the legislatures of 45 advanced industrial democracies by relying on findings from an expert survey. Second, we provide in-depth case studies of two legislatures: the European Parliament and the United States Congress. These cases provide us with complimentary and contrasting perspectives that allow us to test the robustness of our theoretical claims. While both legislatures share similar institutional structures, such as strong committee systems and party-based politics, they vary significantly in the number of parties at play, the role of party leadership in the legislative process, floor procedures, the electoral systems by which members are chosen, and the resources available to legislators in pursing their policy objectives. Our cases allow us to model similarities and differences across the two legislatures and thus to reap the benefits of systematic comparison. We can therefore draw specific expectations about how LMO systems should differ across these cases. For instance, given the nature of the single member district, plurality vote electoral system in the U.S., which provides incentives for legislators to cater to the preferences of particular constituencies, we expect the Congress to have more LMOs than the European Parliament, for individual legislators to join more LMOs, and for signaling to be relatively more prevalent in the Congress.
Our comparative research design also offers intriguing findings about systematic differences between our cases. While respondents in both EP and Congress highlight the importance and value of cross-partisanship in LMOs, for example, we find the nature of cross-partisanship to differ between the two chambers. In the European Parliament, where multiparty policy coalitions are needed for legislation to pass, intergroups serve as arenas for contestation, bargaining, political coordination, and the exchange of political information across party groups. Cross-partisanship in intergroups is, in other words, explicitly political. This stands in contrast to the Congress, where the majority party does not require support from across the aisle to pass legislation (at least in the House of Representatives). In this context, many caucuses seek to protect their bipartisan nature by consciously eschewing divisive issues, making LMOs almost apolitical forums for the exchange of substantive information.
In our case studies, we will rely on three types of data. First, we collect complete LMO membership information for at least six years (2-3 legislative terms) for each legislature. Analyzed using quantitative methods, these data allow us to predict the factors that determine membership in LMOs.
Second, we use this membership information as relational data that are analyzed in a social network analysis framework. This allows us to investigate the structure of LMO networks, to establish which legislative actors hold influential positions within the LMO network, and to determine how LMOs relate to more formal legislative institutions, such as parties and committees. Social network analysis constitutes a critical part of our analysis, since our argument emphasizes the importance of LMOs as venues that allow legislators to establish social connections with colleagues who share their policy priorities, and that facilitate information exchange throughout the legislature. Social network analysis has been a mainstay in sociology for many years, and in recent decades has become more frequently used in economics, anthropology, physics, computer science, political science, policy analysis, and other fields.
Social network analysis focuses on investigating social relationship, or ties, between individuals, or nodes, and how these connections impact social and political interactions, processes, and outcomes. The basic unit of analysis is thus not the individual, but dyads (or pairs) of individual actors. As such, social network analysis seeks to identify and demonstrate "aspects of social organization that are not captured by the study of individual attributes or characteristics" (Ward, Stovel, and Sacks 2011, 246) .
The study of social relations between political actors is not new to Political
Science (e.g., Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1944; Berelson, Lazarsfeld, and McPhee 1954; Patterson 1959; Galtung 1971; Wallerstein 1974; Baumgartner and Burns 1976; Knoke 1976; Laumann and Pappi 1976) , but the approach has seen a notable resurgence in the recent past. 8 Until the turn of the century, social network analysis in the social sciences was dominated by sociologists, with Robert Huckfeldt standing out as a notable exception and early proponent of formal network analysis in the Political Science field (see Huckfeldt 1979 Huckfeldt , 1983 Huckfeldt and Sprague 1987; Huckfeldt et al. 1995 The third type of data we rely on is qualitative. We conducted 86 in-depth interviews with legislators, their staffs, and outside interest groups to examine the activities of LMOs, how they operate, and how they relate to actors outside of the legislative arena. Given the dearth of previous research on LMOs, especially in a comparative perspective, these interview data are of special importance because they provide first-hand accounts of the roles that LMOs play in legislative processes, and how their benefits have contributed to legislative outcomes.
In sum, this mixed-method approach provides for significant analytical purchase on the question of why legislatures create LMOs, why members join and choose to be active in these organizations, and what role LMOs play in legislative politics.
Plan of the Book
This book is organized into 7 chapters, including this introduction. Chapter 5 focuses on the relational functions of LMOs. We present evidence for our proposition that LMOs allow legislators to build social relationships with one another using our interview data. Then, Chapter 5 moves on to a careful examination of LMO network structures using a variety of social network analysis tools. These analyses confirm one of our key theoretical propositions: that LMO ties are bridging ties that connect legislators who would not otherwise be connected to each other. Hence, the structure of LMO networks is such that it ought to facilitate the flow of policy-relevant information throughout the legislature.
Having made this case, Chapter 6 investigates if this potential for efficient information flow is realized, and confirms that LMOs are important arenas for the exchange of both policy and political information. Information exchange takes place both inside the legislature, between LMO members and their offices, but also between insiders and outside advocates that are associated with particular LMOs. These outside organizations, we show, supply legislative subsidies to LMOs and their members by providing policy-relevant information, and also by bearing many of the costs associated with creating and running LMOs.
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Finally, Chapter 7 reflects on how exactly LMOs might matter in legislative politics; it also concludes this volume. We consider two types of impact LMOs might have on legislative processes and outcomes: direct and indirect. Having provided evidence from both EP and Congress that demonstrates how LMOs sometimes influence legislative processes and outcomes directly, however, we come to the conclusion that, most of the time, the impact of LMOs is indirect and diffuse. LMOs influence the legislative process during its early stages, when legislators are gathering information and communicating with the various stakeholders who share a common interest in an issue or cause. They affect discourse, attention, and priorities, and help disseminate otherwise unavailable, policy-relevant information through social networks composed of political actors who share common policy priorities. This is how LMOs matter, and why legislators choose to expend valuable time and resources on them.
